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"THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF REAL REFORM":
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
JOHN M. CONLEYt
When I was asked to speak about the Constitution's adaptability to chang-
ing technology, my thoughts initially turned to the future. I conjured up a post-
Orwellian world and began to speculate about the effect of genetic engineering,
computer technology, predictive psychology, and exotic medical procedures on
traditional notions of individual liberty, privacy, and freedom of speech. The
more I thought about the question, though, the more I began to appreciate how
much experience we already have with the role of science and technology in
constitutional lawmaking. On a number of memorable occasions, courts facing
constitutional issues have looked directly to the most advanced science of the
time for crucial evidence, or even for decisionmaking standards. In fact, we
have enough experience that not only are we not relegated to speculating about
what happens when judges try to adapt the Constitution to changing technology,
but we can identify some significant themes in this ongoing process.
In my talk today I will focus on one of these themes, what I call the prob-
lem of debatable premises. In my remarks, I will describe the problem with
reference to a striking historical example, follow the theme through several more
recent cases, and conclude with some thoughts about the relevance of this his-
tory to current and forthcoming issues of law and technology.
I doubt that anything brings the entire relationship between law and science
into sharper focus than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' notorious peroration in
Buck v. Bell,1 "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."' 2 Law students and
other casual readers tend to take the line as a nasty aside, or perhaps a not-too-
subtle expression of class and regional bias. In fact, Holmes intended it as
neither. It was, rather, a carefully worded statement of the Supreme Court's-
or at least Justice Holmes'-belief that there was an irrefutable scientific basis
for upholding the compulsory sterilization of a mentally retarded woman. I
want to examine the Court's reliance on this purported scientific basis, not for
purposes of criticizing the decision, but in order to expose a conceptual problem
that can arise whenever courts attempt to take account of "state of the art"
scientific knowledge in deciding cases.
Carrie Buck was a poor white woman who was a resident of the Virginia
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1971,
Harvard University; J.D. 1977, Ph.D. 1980, Duke University.
1. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
2. Id. at 207.
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State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded.3 She, her mother, and her ille-
gitimate daughter-Holmes' three generations-had all been classified as feeble
minded-more specifically, as "imbeciles" in the psychological jargon of the
time. In late 1924, when she was eighteen, the state health authorities obtained
an order for her sterilization under a statute enacted a few months earlier4 that
allowed for sterilization of those "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity"
when in "the best interests of the [patient] and of society .... 5 In Buck v. Bell
the Supreme Court found that Virginia's interest in controlling the propagation
of the mentally defective more than outweighed any substantive due process in-
terest that Carrie Buck had in preserving her reproductive capacity.
6
Statutes such as the 1924 Virginia act were products of the eugenics move-
ment of the 1920s.7 The unwitting inspiration for the movement was the
Frenchman Alfred Binet, who at the turn of the century developed a standard-
ized test of certain cognitive skills to assist in identifying children with special
educational needs.8 In the period before World War I, American psychologists,
principally H. H. Goddard and Lewis Terman, revised and popularized Binet's
test. Whereas Binet had intended only to provide a remedial tool for educators,
and had specifically disclaimed any effort to measure the abstraction we call
intelligence, the Stanford-Binet test quickly became the primary instrument of a
psychological school dedicated to the propositions that intelligence is a measura-
ble entity, that it is largely inherited, and thus little affected by education and
other environmental factors, and that intelligence is likely to differ significantly
among groups of genetically related individuals. 9
During World War I, the psychologist Robert M. Yerkes persuaded the
military authorities to support a program of mass intelligence testing of army
recruits.10 The administration of the tests was often farcical, as linguistic, cul-
tural, and literacy barriers were ignored or dealt with inadequately (recent im-
migrants might be marked down, for example, if they could not identify such
American standards as Christy Mathewson and the Smith & Wesson re-
volver).' I Nonetheless, the tests yielded an enormous body of data, the interpre-
tation of which ranged from incompetent to disingenuous.
3. Id. at 205. For further background and commentary, see A. CHASE, THE LEGACY OF
MALTHUS 313-18 (1977); S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 335-36 (1981).
4. Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1974).
5. Id. at 569. The statute was finally repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 296, 1974 Va. Acts
445, and ultimately was replaced by a statute that makes no reference to hereditary mental illness,
providing instead for involuntary sterilization when a court finds that a mentally incompetent adult
is sexually active and less drastic forms of contraception would be ineffective. See VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54-325.11 to .15 (Michie 1982).
6. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
7. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 15-16, 313.
8. See S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 146-54. In addition to the Chase and Gould books cited
supra note 3, readers interested in the history of the eugenics movement may wish to consult H.
EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, THE INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY (1981); and R. LEWONTIN, S. ROSE, &
L. KAMIN, NOT IN OUR GENES (1984).
9. See S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 155-92.
10. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 226-51; S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 192-222.
11. Yerkes, Psychological Examining in the United States Army, 15 MEMOIRS NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. 1 (1921).
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Yerkes found striking differences in IQ among racial and ethnic groups;
recruits of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic ancestry fared best, while American blacks
and immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe fared worst.12 With the aid
of some remarkable feats of logic, Yerkes interpreted his data as affirming that
IQ differences resulted from differences in inherited and largely immutable intel-
lectual capabilities, ascribing little effect to environmental factors such as health
and education. For example, in assessing differences in IQ scores between blacks
and whites, Yerkes did acknowledge a correlation between IQ and level of edu-
cation. But instead of drawing the obvious inference that schooling improved a
person's ability to answer IQ test questions, he concluded that blacks chose not
to go to school because, as the tests proved, they were innately less intelligent.
13
Similarly, his data showed a consistent positive correlation between immigrants'
test scores and the number of years they had been in the United States. This
would seem to be strong evidence that learning English and becoming familiar
with American culture improves one's IQ score. Yerkes demurred, however; he
and his colleagues mooted the alternative explanation that it was the more intel-
ligent immigrants who stayed in America, while their duller counterparts gave
up and went home. 14 Not unexpectedly, the beneficiaries of this explanation
were the older, Northern European immigrant stocks; existing prejudices against
more recent immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were left unchal-
lenged. Throughout the 890 pages of his highly influential monograph on the
army tests, Yerkes repeatedly manipulated or ignored data that might have un-
dercut his a priori beliefs that IQ tests measure intelligence, and that intelligence
is controlled by heredity.
Glossing over Yerkes's analytical shortcomings, a broad alliance of scien-
tists, writers, and politicians seized on his conclusions as support for a legal
agenda with clear racist connotations. Princeton psychologist C. C. Brigham,
characterizing Yerkes's work as "an investigation which, of course, surpasses in
reliability all preceding investigations ... a hundred fold"' 5 warned of "[t]he
deterioration of American intelligence."' 16 He attributed it to "the change in the
races migrating to this country .... the sending of lower and lower representa-
tives of each race," 17 and "the most sinister development in the history of this
continent, the importation of the negro."' 8 He offered a two-part solution to the
problem: first, immigration laws that would be "not only restrictive ... but
highly selective"; and second, and more important, "the prevention of the con-
tinued propagation of defective strains in the present population."' 19
Lobbying vigorously, the eugenicists-whose ranks in the 1920s included
Herbert Hoover, Henry Fairfield Osborn, president of the American Museum of
12. Id. at 697, 820; see S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 197.
13. Yerkes, supra note 11, at 779-83; see S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 217-19.
14. Yerkes, supra note 11, at 701-04; see S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 220-21.
15. C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE XX (1923).
16. Id. at 210.
17. Id. at 178.
18. Id. at xxi.
19. Id. at 210.
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Natural History, Charles Darwin's grandson, and an impressive array of scien-
tific luminaries2° -brought about a major change in U.S. immigration law. In
1920, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was persuaded
to appoint an official called an "Expert Eugenics Agent." This official, Harry
Laughlin, was a major figure at the Second International Congress of Eugenics
in 1921; through him, the Committee was inundated with "scientific" data dem-
onstrating that intelligence is a measurable entity, hereditarily controlled, and
differentially distributed among ethnic groups. 21 The result of this campaign
was the Immigration Act of 1924.22 Its predecessor, the 1921 Act,23 set national
quotas with reference to the numbers of immigrants from given countries who
were in the United States at the time of the most recent census. The 1924 Act
turned back the clock, setting quotas not according to the current representation
of different nationalities, but according to their representation in 1890.24 Be-
cause immigration prior to 1890 had been primarily from Northern Europe, the
effect of this change was to put severe limits on future immigration from South-
ern and Eastern Europe.25 In particular, the new system meant that America
was closed to many European Jews who might otherwise have found refuge here
in the years leading up to World War I.
To return to Buck v. Bell, the Virginia sterilization law at issue was also a
product of the eugenics movement. In fact, congressional Expert Eugenicist
Harry Laughlin published a Model Eugenical Sterilization Law in 1922. Ulti-
mately, a majority of the states enacted sterilization statutes.
26
The Supreme Court relied explicitly on the eugenics research program in
upholding the Virginia statute. In his recitation of the facts of the case, Justice
Holmes noted "that experience has shown that heredity plays an important part
in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c. '" 27 This "experience" was, of
course, Yerkes' research on army recruits and the other scientific writing that it
spawned. Holmes also acknowledged the finding in the Virginia proceedings
that Carrie Buck was "'the probable potential parent of socially inadequate off-
spring,' "28 a finding based largely on the results of a Stanford-Binet IQ test,
interpreted in the light of eugenic assumptions about the inheritable and incorri-
gible nature of low intelligence. 29 Balancing the scientifically justified interests
20. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 277.
21. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 289; S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 232.
22. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) repealed by Act of
June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 403(a), 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952). For a brief review of the
legislative history of the 1924 Act, see E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965 185-94 (1981).
23. Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 5, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5 (1921) repealed by Act ofJune 27,
1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 403(a), 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952).
24. Immigration Act of 1924, supra note 22, § 11(a), at 159. The Act set even more restrictive
quotas which were scheduled to take effect in 1927 but were not actually implemented until 1929.
Id. § 1 l(b); see E. HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 189-94.
25. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 290-91; S. GOULD, supra note 3, at 233.
26. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 15-16; H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 8, at 93.
27. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206.
28. Id. at 207 (quoting the lower court's finding).
29. See A. CHASE, supra note 3, at 313.
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of the state against the interests of Carrie Buck, he concluded that "[i]t is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are man-
ifestly unfit from continuing their kind."
30
Holmes' published writings and private correspondence make clear that he
took this opinion seriously, and intended it as an endorsement of the role of
science in shaping constitutional law. Just after he wrote the opinion, but before
it was printed, he described the case to his English correspondent Harold Laski
as one concerning "the constitutionality of an act for sterilizing feeble-minded
people, with due precaution-as to which my lad tells me the religious are
astir."''a Science provided an adequate answer to "the religious," however; as he
wrote to Laski two weeks later, "I wrote and delivered an opinion upholding the
constitutionality of a state law for sterilizing imbeciles the other day-and felt
that I was getting near the first principle of real reform."
32
By the time of the decision in Buck v. Bell, eugenics had already begun to
collapse as a scientific discipline. Walter Lippmann had exposed most of its
critical weaknesses in a series of articles in the New Republic in 1922. He em-
phasized the fundamental point that "intelligence is not an abstraction like
length and weight; it is an exceedingly complicated notion which nobody has yet
succeeded in defining." 33 Then, in 1930, C. C. Brigham, one of the most influen-
tial scientific proponents of eugenics, recanted. Accepting Lippmann's point, he
accused himself and his colleagues of a "naming fallacy" which allowed them
"to slide mysteriously from the score in the test to the hypothetical faculty sug-
gested by the name given to the test."' 34 He repudiated the whole concept of
national and racial comparisons based on intelligence test scores, and then, in
what is surely the most remarkable statement I have ever read in a scientific
publication, concluded, "One of the most pretentious of these comparative racial
studies-the writer's own-was without foundation."
35
In subsequent years, much of the most important eugenics research was
exposed as sloppy, biased, and, in one famous case, absolutely fraudulent. 36 But
perhaps the most eloquent critique of eugenics came from Carrie Buck's imbe-
cile daughter, who went to a foster home, attended a regular elementary school,
and made above-average grades until her premature death.
37
The debunking of the eugenics "experience" that Justice Holmes cited came
30. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
31. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Apr. 25, 1927), reprinted in 2
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1916-1935 937-38 (M. Howe ed. 1953). For a general statement of
Holmes' views about the relationship between science and law, see Holmes, The Path of Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
32. Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 12, 1927), reprinted in 2 HOLMEs-LASKi LETTERS 1916-
1935 941, 942 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
33. Lippmann, The Mystery of the "A" Men, 32 NEw REPUBLIC 246 (Nov. 1, 1922).
34. Brigham, Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups, 37 PSYCH'L REv. 158, 159 (1930).
35. Id. at 165.
36. See H. EYSENCK & L. KAMIN, supra note 8, at 98-105 (discussing Cyril Burt's twin
studies).
37. See Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, NATURAL HISTORY, July 1984, at 17-18.
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too late, however-too late to help Carrie Buck and countless other feeble-
minded victims, and too late to alter the fate of millions of Southern and Eastern
Europeans, particularly Jews, who were excluded from America by the Immi-
gration Act of 1924. The question for us is what we can learn from this experi-
ence. One reaction might be to criticize me for unfair treatment of Holmes and
the legislators who accepted the nearly unanimous teaching of the leading scien-
tists of the day. This misses the point, however. Ad hominem criticism is not
my purpose; I agree that historical figures should be judged by the standards of
their own times.
My point, rather, is that the history I have recounted reveals a danger that
is present whenever the law, even in pursuit of "real reform," responds quickly
and decisively to science. At one level, lawyers, judges, and legislators are quite
capable of critical evaluation of scientific proposals. We can, for example, do the
kinds of things we routinely do under Article VII of the Rules of Evidence:
make sure that the scientist is qualified, has made a careful study of the problem,
has followed the methodological canons of his discipline, and has relied on
sources reasonably relied on by those in his field. Holmes implicitly raised and
answered these questions in Buck. But what if there is a problem at a deeper
level: what if the fundamental theoretical premises on which the entire disci-
pline is based are suspect or disputed? How can the law recognize such a di-
lemma, and even if it can, how can it resolve it? Walter Lippmann saw that the
eugenics movement was based on a flawed understanding of intelligence, but
would it have been reasonable for the Congress and the Supreme Court to disre-
gard the great weight of scientific "fact" and take the word of a young
journalist?
One might next ask whether the failure of this particular merger of law and
science was not simply an anomaly. Buoyed by, for example, the Court's salu-
tary appreciation of social science data in Brown v. Board of Education,3 8 might
we not conclude that the mistakes of the 1920s were a historical accident not
likely to recur in more enlightened times? I reject this interpretation for two
reasons.
First, some of the very issues raised in Buck v. Bell are alive today. There is
much discussion of the use of predictive psychological proffles in the bail and
sentencing processes.39 Some of the more ardent advocates of these profiles ar-
gue for consideration of factors that purportedly indicate a hereditary predispo-
sition to crime. While the argument turns largely on recent and apparently
responsible psychological research,4° I am troubled that some of the highly pub-
licized sponsors of "predictive detention" continue to cite research contaminated
38. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.ll (1954).
39. E.g., Thompson, Born to Burgle, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1986, at 13. This article and a
number of others discuss a quantitative sentencing evaluation system used by the district attorney of
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.
40. E.g., Dunford & Elliott, Identifying Career Offenders Using Self-Reported Data, 21 J. OF
RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 57 (1984); Loeber, Dishion & Patterson, Multiple Gating: A Mul-
tistage Assessment Procedure for Identifying Youths at Risk for Delinquency, 21 J. OF RESEARCH IN
CRIME & DELINQ. 7 (1984).
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by eugenical bias.
4 1
Second, several less dramatic examples from the recent case law suggest to
me that the difficulty of identifying suspect premises is as pervasive and persis-
tent a problem as it ever was. In its 1971 decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,42 the
Court granted an Amish community a partial exemption from a state school-
attendance law. The most significant evidence in the case was the testimony of
anthropologist John Hostetler, the leading authority on Amish society. He testi-
fied without contradiction that compulsory high school attendance would "ulti-
mately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community
.... 43 The Court expressly relied on this evidence in holding that the Amish
could withdraw their children from school after the eighth grade to protect
themselves against an "objective danger to the free exercise of religion . ... "44
The majority rejected Justice Douglas' argument that the right of the children to
a full range of career options had been given inadequate consideration. 45
Once again, my purpose is not to criticize the decision, but to question the
process whereby the Court responded to scientific data in defining a constitu-
tional right. As the Court correctly noted, Hostetler is the leading anthropologi-
cal expert on the Amish;46 as it might have noted, he is a careful and ethical
scientist. In this case, he presented a wealth of data that seemed to support his
conclusion. Moreover, his findings were uncontradicted. Thus, by all the
criteria the law usually applies to scientific evidence, his findings were
unimpeachable.
However, as one legal anthropologist has noted, the surface unanimity sur-
rounding Hostetler's findings masked a fundamental theoretical dispute within
anthropology.47 In particular, many anthropologists (including me) would take
issue with an analysis of Amish culture (or almost any contemporary culture) as
a static entity so free from outside influence that a modest increment in such
influence would tip the balance against survival. Moreover, Hostetler was raised
as an Amishman. Without questioning his integrity, one could question the ob-
jectivity of a study of a culture by someone with an emotional attachment to it.
Thus, Hostetler's findings, while unimpeachable in the traditional legal sense,
were suspect at a level that the Court and the parties could not reasonably be
expected to penetrate. The result, in my view, is a benign version of Buck v.
Bell: a decision profoundly affecting the lives of people who cannot speak for
themselves that conveys a misleading impression of being dictated by scientific
fact.
Similar conceptual problems abound in other areas of law. In civil rights
41. E.g., J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Id. at 212.
44. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 210 n. 5, 212. Much of what the court said about the Amish culture and religion was
drawn directly from Hostetler's trial court testimony. See Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Wit-
ness, 79 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 562-63 (1977).
47. See Rosen, supra note 46, at 564.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and employment discrimination cases, for example, the courts have often per-
mitted statistical proof of unlawful conduct. Statistical tests and standards that
are persuasive to one court tend to be permitted by others; some specific tech-
niques have been approved by the Supreme Court.48 The courts have developed
reasonable facility in qualifying statistical experts, in determining that particular
methods are widely used, and in ensuring that analyses are carefully performed.
Yet beneath the growing consensus on the use of some methods is an often ob-
scure debate among statisticians about the theoretical justifications for particular
methods and the propriety of transferring them from one context to another.49
The outcome of these debates could cause today's scientific "fact" to become
tomorrow's heresy, and today's enlightened legal decision to become a latter day
Buck v. Bell.
A related problem has arisen in the abortion case law. Here it is not so
much a problem of debatable premises as changing premises. In Roe v. Wade,
50
the Supreme Court's original abortion decision, the Court held that the woman's
rights are almost absolute until the end of the first trimester, "because of the
now-established medical fact ... that until the end of the first trimester mortal-
ity in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. '5 l At the other
end of the continuum, the Court held that a compelling state interest in protect-
ing potential life arises at the point of viability.52 The problem with this ap-
proach, of course, is that medical technology is constantly improving the safety
of abortion, thus pushing the first point forward, at the same time that it pushes
the point of viability backward. In Justice O'Connor's words, "the Roe frame-
work.., is... on a collision course with itself."' 53 She questions the propriety
of" 'strik[ing] down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable
social policy,'" under the guise of reliance on neutral scientific data.
54
To conclude, I want to consider what guidance cases such as these can offer
for future interactions between science and the law. To my mind, the fatal flaw
in these cases is the misperception of science as a well oiled machine for generat-
ing truth, a process somehow less susceptible to human passion and error than is
law. When science suggests the resolution of a legal problem, a lawmaker with
this view may take comfort in rising above the admittedly human and inherently
fallible process of traditional lawmaking-he may believe, in Holmes' words,
that he is "approaching the first principle of real reform."
48. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1976) (difference of two or three
standard deviations usually significant).
49. E.g., Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PRoas. 189 (1983) (critique of EEOC statistical guidelines); Kaye, Statisti-
calSignificance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1983) (critique of law's
use of statistical significance).
50, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id.
53. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting),
54. Id. at 453 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see
Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639 (1986).
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But as the history I have reviewed demonstrates, and as any honest scientist
will admit, science is an all-too-human process, as susceptible as any other to
bias, animus, and short-sightedness. The problem is that often the human frailty
of science can be detected and exposed only by the trained insider. The outsider,
even one as astute as Holmes, may confront a wall of superficial unanimity, and
see no cause to inquire further.
So what is the law to do? In my view, it should respond with extreme care
when science demands that new legal doctrine be created or established doctrine
be altered radically. The more strident the demand, the more cautious it should
be. Above all, judges and legislators should look skeptically at the scientific
process, remembering that such terms as "fact," "truth" and "law" are, in most
cases, as relative for scientists as they are for the rest of us.
Recently, Congress has been widely criticized for failing to make sweeping
changes in our copyright law to meet the demands of computer technology. 5"
Similarly, many writers have criticized the Supreme Court for not setting more
definitive guidelines concerning the status of genetically engineered life forms
and computer software under the patent and copyright clause of the Constitu-
tion and the statutes enacted pursuant to it.56 Perhaps, as some have claimed,
Congress and the Court were overwhelmed by the technological problems and
suffered a simple failure of nerve. Perhaps, however, with deference to history,
Congress and the Court were implicitly acknowledging the danger of creating
novel legal doctrine to meet the exigencies of science.
For whatever reason, in moving slowly and asking more questions than
they answered, both bodies did the prudent thing. The findings of science some-
times have appealed to lawmakers as a simple substitute for the complex interac-
tion among precedent, facts, and values that comprise legal decisionmaking, and
as a source of certainty in an otherwise uncertain world. But the appeal of sci-
ence as a first principle of real reform has been often illusory, and sometimes
dangerous. If the Constitution is "to endure for ages to come" in the face of
technological challenge, real reform must continue to be inspired by the docu-
ment itself and the eminently human processes it has spawned.
55. In 1974, Congress created the blue-ribbon National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974). In
1978 the Commission delivered a lengthy and scholarly report. The only result of all this effort was
a set of 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), which added a definition of
.1computer program" to existing § 101 and enacted a new § 117 which gave limited reproduction
rights to "owners" of computer programs. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028 (1980). This six-year effort thus resulted in little or no guidance on such critical ques-
tions as the scope of protectible expression in computer programs and the standards for proving
software infringement. See Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1985).
56. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Court held that genetically engi-
neered microorganisms could constitute patentable subject matter, but provided no definitive guide-
lines for future cases.

